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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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JOHN H. MORGAN, SR., JOHN H. MORGAN,
JR., CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM, JUSTHEIM
PETROLEUM COMPANY, and HUSKY OIL
COMPANY,
Case No. 14115

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
- v BOARD OF STATE LANDS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, a
division of the UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, and
CHARLES R. HANSEN, as Director of
)
the DIVISION OF STATE LANDS,
)

•

- Defendants-Respondents.
•-ooOoo
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed suit to obtain a declaratory
judgment that there was an "implied contract1* with the Board of
State Lands for replacement of 1963 oil shale leases expiring
December '31# 1973# with the new form of 20-year leases authorized
by the Board in 1.965, notwithstanding the lessees failed to pay
the six cents per acre conversion fee and filing fees/ and also
failed to sign and file the required applications to amend the
1963 leases or the amended form of oil shale leases at any time
prior to the expiration dates of the 10-year leases.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Following discovery proceedings, Defendants-Respondents
filed a motion for summary judgment supported by uncontroverted
affidavits.

Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a counter motion for

summary judgment, with an affidavit.

Counsel for the respective

parties stated that if a trial were conducted, no further evidence
would be presented.

The District Court denied Plaintiffs' motion

for summary judgment and granted Defendants1 motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the 10-year oil shale leases issued
in 1963 expired by their express terms on December 31, 1973, and

,

that the lessees had failed and neglected to pay the required fees
or to execute the documents required by the Board of State Lands

I

to effectuate a conversion of the 1963 leases into the 20-year

•

form of oil shale leases.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

J

By reason of omission of nearly all of the admissions

•

contained in the complaint and by Plaintiffs in discovery proceedings and because of incorrect assertions on pages 3 and 4 of

|

Brief of Appellants, Defendants-Respondents do not agree with the

•

Plaintiffs-Appellants' Statement of Facts, except the following
portions thereof on pages 2 to 4, which quoted statements only
are accepted:

|
•

/-.•J).

I

2
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1#
In 1963, the Board issued the Leases,
to expire by their terms on December 31, 1963 /l9737#
to the Morgans (admitted in pleadings).
"2. In 1964, the Morgans assigned the Leases
to Husky, but remained the Lessees of record to whom
the Board sent notices and billings (R. 113).
"3. In 1965# the Board adopted a 20 year lease
form and passed a resolution that leases under previously issued oil shale leases should have opportunity
to convert to the new form (R* 9-11, admitted in the
pleadings)•
"4. On September 29, 1965, the Director sent to
all oil shale lessees a letter (herein called the
September Letter1) in which a procedure for converting to the new 20 year lease form was explained (R. 21).
*

*

*

"

•

.

«

.

:

.

.

.

:

.

.

,

The following statement also would be acceptable to respondents with the word "required" in lieu of "suggested":
"5. The record does not show that either Husky
or the Morgans ever followed the conversion procedure
suggested by the September Letter. * * * ."
Also, the following statement on page 4 of Brief of Appellants is approved, subject to amplification hereinafter:
"7. Early in 1974, after the Board had cashed
Appellants' rental payment check, the Board returned
the money to Appellants with the announcement that it
considered the Leases to have expired (R. 50-52)."
Respondents present the following additional facts deemed
to be relevant and material:
The letter from the Director, dated September 29, 1965,
a

copy of which (except for his signature) is attached to the
3
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complaint as Exhibit "C" (R. 21# 190), stated, inter alia:
11

* * * the Utah State Land Board at its meeting held September 9-10, 1965, made the following decisions relative to the proposed amended Oil Shale
Lease form and the proposed amended Asphaltic SandsBituminous Sands lease form:
"(1) It adopted the attached form of Oil Shale
lease subject to approval by the Attorney General's
Office* The Board also indicated that the Staff
should continue issuing Oil Shale leases on a multiple-use basis.
"These forms were formally approved by the Attorney General by letter of September 20, 1965.
"For your information, enclosed please find
copy of the new Oil Shale lease form, copy of the addendum
to the Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous Sands lease and copy
of a form of application to amend.
"Applications to amend existing Oil Shale leases
* * * will be granted upon receipt by this office of a
fully executed application and a fully executed amendment of Oil Shale lease * * * . The applicant must also
tender a sum equal to 6fi per acre of the leased land together with a $2.00 filing fee." (R. 21, 190).
By paragraph 6 of the complaint, plaintiffs "acknowledge
receipt of said letter" (R. 3). By paragraph 7 of their complaint,
it is expressly alleged that "Plaintiffs took no formal action with
regard to the leases in response to Exhibit 'C'" (R.3).

Attached

to the complaint as Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of one of the 1963
oil shale leases (R. 6-8). By paragraph 3 of the complaint, it
is stated that the 1963 leases issued to plaintiffs "were to expire,
by their terms as originally issued, on December 31, 1973" (R.2-3).

4
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Exhibit "B", attached tb the;complaint* consists of quotations
from some minutes of the State Land Bda^d meetings in 1965
(R, 9-11).

Exhibit

,,

B-l n , attached to the complaint, is a

—

photocopy of the form of application to amend the 1963 oil shale
leases, signed by a third party

(R. 1 2 ) .

It recites that "Lessee

hereby requests th6i Board to grant^an amendment of this lease*1
and also sjiat&s that "in ^consideration therefor Lessee tenders
to the State a cash consideration of
Dollars

($

)# being six cents

•.

*'-' •

-' *••" :'

::

'"-''"*' f!-• •'• •' •

($.06) per leased acre, for

such am^

to the complaint; is a

photocopy of the arnended form of Utah State Oil Shale Lease for a
term of 20, years (R. 13-20).

^i

>

4 ^ -,

In response to defendants 1 interrogatories of August 21,
1974 (R. 109-111), plaintiffs admitted that "no one of plaintiffs"
could "recall having delivered to or otherwise filed at the State
Laxid Office" any application to amend mineral lease relating to
any of the oil shale leases referred to in paragraph 3 of the complaint or signing and filing in the State Land Office the form of
"Amended State of Utah Oil Shale Lease" (Exhibit "B-2", attached
to the c o m p l a i n t ) . p l a i n t i f f s also admitted that they did not at
any time prior to January 1, 1974, pay or tender to the State Land
Board the six cents

($.06) per acre conversion fee and the $2.00
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filing fee mentioned in the letter from the Director.dated
September 29, 1965 (Exhibit "C") (R. 72-73).

, ./

In response to

defendants1 requests for admissions of fact (R.63-66), plaintiffs,
admitted that the 1963 oil shale leases by their own terms would
expire December 31, 1973; that no assignment of any of the 1963
leases ever was filed in the State Land Office; that each of the
plaintiffs who was a lessee under the 1963 oil shale leases received the letter dated May 11, 1965, a copy of which was attached
to the answer of defendants as Exhibit "1"; that each of the said
lessees received a copy of the letter dated September 29, 1965,
from Max C. Gardner, Director of the State Land Board, in the
regular course of the mails; and that each of the plaintiff lessees received with said letter dated September 29, 1965, the form
of "Application to Amend Mineral Lease" (Exhibit "B-l") and also
the form of "Amended Utah Oil Shale Lease," a copy of which is
attached to the complaint as Exhibit "B-2"; and that the Attorney
j.'

General of the State of Utah, on or about September 20, 1965, approved said form of "Amended State of Utah Oil Shale Lease"
(R. 70-71).
In paragraph 7 of their complaint, plaintiffs alleged
that they
" . . . took no formal action with regard to
the leases in response to Exhibit ' C , but plaintiffs
orally communicated to defendant's director and other
6
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personnel their desire and intent that the
leases be replaced by the new form of oil shale
.•••-.."•• lease adopted * * *." (R, 1) •
, ,
. .
plaintiffs'did not allege that thoy ever executed and filed either
the "Application to Amend Mineral Lease" or the amended form of
.Utah OiJ Shale Lease, copies of which a) >: attached id I he complaint as Exhibits "b-1" and "13—2-n

In paragraph 7 of their

.complaint* plaintiffs alleged that "Defendant amended 11 n >ic counting forma and billing rvirds to show the replacement of the
leases,;:with new form leases" and that the accounting cards wore
modified by defendant i;o

irefl ect the i n iderstanding that the

leases had Lean extended*" (Rr 3 ) .
Plaintiffs also alleged:

. . .
.

-;"'.;.;

.:.'< ••.••.•••••...' -..N

• '.,•:,,,•-:•> • , ;:-: • -'-^ ..

. - .-"."'
"8. On or about December 15, 1973, defendant
,,
billed plaintiffs for the 1974 rentals (1974 being
• . -#'•'* the rental year after the leases would have expired
' unless extended in accordance with the procedures
,'. .
. hereinabove set forth) and plaintiffs paid the said
• 1974 rentals as billed during the. calendar year 1973.

r

fl

9« Plaintiffs' relied on .the billings for 1974
-v.:. p'-} .: ..-rentals as representing an acknowledgment by the de**••/ ' fendant of the leases having been replaced, and, ex••;—;- ; v. r.cept for defendant's actions in transmitting said
billings, would have been alerted by their failure
to receive billings that some question as to the conv
tinned'force and effect of the leases had arisen,"
'"'''By paragraph 10, plaintiffs alleged that some time during
January'or February L'//4, defendants adv:i sed plaintiffs that the
l e a s e s haa

not

been replaced by the new form leases and that re-

placement could not tlion be effected,, Ix-cansu pi,i i nLi f< ,:, had

7
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;\

failed to pay the six cents ($.06) per acre conversion fee,
but plaintiffs then tendered payment of the six cents ($.06) per
acre.

Plaintiffs also alleged that they "protested defendant's

termination of the leases# and that the parties1 actions as herein
set forth

have effected the replacement of the leases by new form

leases, and defendant may not now deny such replacement."

Plaint-

iffs also alleged that they were afforded opportunity to present
their case to defendant at a formal meeting; and after hearing,
defendant reasserted that "the leases have been terminated (R. 4 ) .
Plaintiffs prayed for Judgment "declaring that the leases
have been replaced by the new form oil shale lease adopted by defendant in September, 1965, and that defendant is under obligation
to accept the fees for conversion heretofore tendered by plaintiffs
and to effect a formal replacement of the leases with the new form
of oil shale leases" (R. 5).
By the FIRST DEFENSE in their answer, defendants alleged
that the "complaint fails to state facts constituting a claim for
judicial relief" (R. 29).

.

By their answer, defendants specifically denied that
there was ever any "understanding" that any of the 1963 leases
"had been extended."

Defendants alleged that none of the plaint-

iffs complied with the terms and conditions of the letter dated
8
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September 29, 19A5,

Defendants denied that there was any

authorized "amendment of

U s >v count i ng forms and billing cards

to show replacement of any oi3. shale leases with the new or
amended form of oil shaie leases, except as to I V ^

lessees

who complied with the conditions and requirements of Exhibit * Cf
by paying the six cents per acre conversion fee, the $2*00 fiiinq
fee# and executed the application to amend oil shale lease and
also executed the amended form of oil shale le-ise authorized b-/
the Board (R, 30)." Defendants fuxrthe? B! le^e "1 that sending
"billings" (notices) fox. 19V4 rentals to Lessees under 1963 oil
shale leases who had not compi i:;a V/ILdated Sept em« »er Jc),

•.>.•:• \.^' ,-r.i of the letter

190S (Exhibit "C" attached fn

complaint),, was

unauthorized by the Bo=ari and was n r lerical error, (K, 11)
fendants ais. denied tfia

\r -

they "terminated" any of the 1963 oil

shale leases and alleged that plaintiffs utterly failed to comply
with the offer oi the Boai I f"ot funicsndmrjnt of nuch 1903 oil shale
leases, and that plaintiffs, "by their own neglect, had allowed
said 1963 leases to expire by noncompliance with i hr- ul fer contained in said letter dated September 29, 1965 (u„ 32)*
By affirmative defenses defendants aiiegou;

(a) in,it «, C

any oral ^oreemeni or "understanding" had been made, such as
claimed, by plaintiffs, the same would have been without statutory
authority, contrary tu IJM rules and fc-on lat ions of the Board,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 9
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

without consideration and null and void, (b) that Section
65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, requires applications for
mineral leases to be "on such forms as the land board shall
prescribe," and the Board, in 1965, prescribed the form of application to amend mineral lease, and also prescribed the amended
form of 20-year oil shale lease, and issued notice by letter
dated September 29, 1965, together with the forms to be executed
and returned to the State Land Office with the required fees
(R. 33), (c) that at no time prior to expiration of the 1963 oil
shale leases for a term of 10 years did any of plaintiffs comply
with any of the terms and conditions specified by the Board for
converting the 1963 leases into 20-year oil shale leases, (d)
that any oral "agreement" or "understanding" that the 10-year
leases were "extended" or "converted" into 20-year oil shale leases,
if made, would have been null and void contrary to the Statute of
Frauds, Section 25-5-4(1), U.C.A. 1953, and Section 25-5-1, U.C.A.
1953, (e) that Section 65-1-46, U.C.A. 1953, always has provided
that "each lease shall contain covenants" specified in the statute,
and that none of plaintiffs executed the application nor the form
of lease prior to expiration date of the 1963 leases, and that by
reason of nonexecution of the required documents each plaintiff was
and is estopped to claim a 20-year oil shale lease, (f) that Section 65-1-23, U.C.A. 1953, as amended in 1959, provides that the
10
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Board shall prescribe the form ^f a^n

- •

. • ** >r>r--

lease, the annual rental, and the royalty and other details,
(g) that excerpts fr^rr i9^H minutes of meetings
shown in Exhib.i .

',

= . <• ,; -^ru

^ '.s.-V-Hd i-n the complaint, show that che •

Board adopted the form of application and the form of 20-year
oil shale lease, and prescribed the £ef\s for converting 10-year
leases into 20-year leases, and that each of the -olainilffs failed
and neglected to pay the rnquLroa n^&^ .»nc: .:o. .,«• -o«: . * v.-,-, ;/.
the required documents, r'") -chat no statute autno^i^ed -.^y waiver
or exception to compliance with the offer made b/ V H - L- ».-.*
j>

that Sectio: • ^-„.. ~

f'i

sea:

"c'xLl i.eup.es ,raJ r'oncract.:- ~;f every kind entered
inti~- by the frtate ban*; Board shall before execution
by such Board be ;-tpproveo as *•* form by the Attorney
Gerun'riJ . "
No claimed "oral understanding" was or could be approved by the
Attorney General

>.-•-,.

It is undisputed that on December 31, 1973, a letter was
received at the State Land ofla.co dat/:d December /' 7, 1M7T, from
fftah Resources International, Inc., signed by John H. Morgan, Jr.,
which stated: .
" E n c l o s e d n« jewi-cn e h e c ^ in L ne a^non^t o :
$2'*,. 2 5 8 . 5 0 c o v e r i n g lc>74 r e n t a l s on ' >-c- Uta'i M.ate
O i l o h a l o , j i l , Gas 6, ^hydrocarbon^ and b i t u m i n o u s
Sands Leasee a s f a l l o w s :
"'iib^JX^?-JJfiL

<ljbV.

Rental

20668
2 4 . 6Law
0 Library, J. Reuben
G25.00
shale
0 i i
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* i'

'

/The list included 25 oil shale leases identified by lease numbers set forth in paragraph 3 of
the complaint, issued in 1963, together with 16 oil,
gas and hydrocarbon leases and 2 bituminous sands
leases identified by lease numbers^
Accompanying such letter was a check in the name of Utah
Resources International, Inc., signed by John H. Morgan, Jr.,
payable to the Division of State Lands in the total amount of
$24,258.50 (R. 46-48, 50-51).

Said check was deposited for

collection on January 4, 1974. Donald G. Prince, of the Division
of State Lands, stated under oath that said check was not returned
to sender for the reason that it included amounts becoming due for
1974 rentals on some oil, gas and hyrdrocarbon leases and also on
bituminous sands leases not expiring (R. 49-53).
On March 8, 1974, the Board of State Lands directed a
refund of a total of $13,834.00 for the "1974 rentals" paid on
the 1963 oil shale leases which the Board found had expired on
December 31, 1973.
1974 (R. 52, 68-69).

Said refund checks were mailed on March 12,
Plaintiffs then requested the Board to

"acknowledge" said leases as having been "extended," claiming
that the opinion of an assistant attorney general to the effect
that the 1963 oil shale leases had expired on December 31, 1973,
was in error.

The Board of State Lands granted plaintiffs a

hearing, which was held April 17, 1974 (R. 78).
12

• * '
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.

Prior to such hearing before the Board, under date of
February 26, 1974, Utah Resources International, Inc., by its
president, John H. Morgan, Jr., issued to the Division of State
Lands a check for $829.78, as the computed six cents ($.06) per
acre in each of the 1963 oil shale leases which had been issued
to plaintiffs (except Husky).

Following the April hearing by the

Board of State Lands, the Board advised the applicants in writing
that they had failed to prove compliance with the terms and conditions of the letter dated September 29, 1965, and that all of the
1963 oil shale leases issued to them had expired December 31, 1973,
and could not be reinstated.

The check for $829.78 was also re-

turned (R. 65-69, 70-71).
Plaintiffs then filed suit for declaratory judgment.
Following discovery proceedings, defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment of "no cause of action," supported by affidavits
of Max C. Gardner, former Director of the Board of State Lands,
Charles R. Hansen, who has been Director of the Division of State
Lands since April 26, 1967, and Donald G. Prince, a member of the
staff of the State Land Office since 1954 (R. 81-92, 93-97, 98-104,
105-108).

Plaintiffs then filed a counter-motion for summary

judgment, together with affidavit of John H. Morgan, Jr., one of
plaintiffs, along with copy of agreements between the other
plaintiffs and Husky Oil Company (R. 112-129).

At the time of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hearing on the respective motions for summary judgment, it
was conceded by counsel for the respective parties that all evidence which the parties could produce, including affidavits covering all testimony which could be presented at a trial, was before
the court; and that if a trial were held, no further evidence
would be submitted.
In addition to oral arguments, counsel submitted written
memoranda.

The case was taken under advisement January 21, 1975.

On April 18, 1975, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, District Judge,
denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted defendants1 motion for summary judgment (R. 187). Summary judgment of
"no cause of action" against plaintiffs and in favor of all of the
defendants

and judgment of dismissal of the action with prejudice

were entered April 29, 1975. From such judgment plaintiffs appealed
(R. 188-193, 195),
On May 29, 1975, plaintiffs-appellants filed their "STATEMENT OF POINTS" with their designation of the record, by which
they alleged:
"1. The evidence is insufficient to support the findings of the court that, as a matter of law, there was
no implied agreement between the parties for extension
of the leases which are the subject of this litigation.
"2. The evidence is insufficient to support the
finding and ruling of the court that defendants are not
estopped to deny the evidence of the leases which are
the subject of this litigation "(R. 198).
' 14:.;
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fiRGUMENT

POINT i .

'

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
SHOULD ' B*! AFFIRMED BY REASON 'OF UmMBIGUOUS WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL FACTS EXPRESSLY ADMITTED BY PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS IN THEIR COMPLAINT AND IN DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS,
SHOWING (A) THAT THEIR 1963 OIL SHALE LEASES WOULD EXPIRE
DECEMBER 31, 1973, AMD (B) BY REASON OF PLAINTIFFS' ADMITTED
FAILURE TO TIMELY ACCEPT AND COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF
THE 1965 WRITTEN OFFER OF THE LAND BOARD TO AMEND THE 1963
LEASES INTO 20-YEAR LEASES.
,

:

The Brief of Appellants attempts to side-step nearly
all of the fatal admissions made by plaintiffs-appellants in
their complaint and in discovery proceedings. The applicable
Utah statutes relating to mineral leasing of state lands are
ignored by appellants.

^

In effect, what plaintiffs-appellants

appear to seek by their appeal is judicial legislation for the
special benefit of appellants, not only for suspension of the
operation of some Utah statutes, but to relieve appellants of
the consequences of their failure and neglect to accept timely
and to comply with an offer made more than 8 years previously by
the Board by letter dated September 29<f 1965, to all holders of
10-year 1963 state oil shale leases (expiring December 31, 1973)
to amend and convert those leases into the 1965 amended form of
oil shale lease with a primary term of 20 years, and also containing some different provisions.
That 1965 offer made by the Board through its authorized
Director could be accepted only (a) by payment of six cents ($.06)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
1 K OCR, may contain errors.

per acre conversion or amendment fee plus a filing fee per lease
of §2.00; (b) by filing the required form of written application
to amend the 1963 oil shale lease; and (c) by execution and delivery to the State Land Office of the amended form of oil shale
lease adopted by the Board in 1965•
There was no provision in the 1963 oil shale lease for
any extension of the primary term of 10 years, except by production . There never was any claim of production to preclude expiration of the 1963 oil shale leases on December 31, 1973. The Land
Board never made any offer to gratuitously extend the 10-year
primary term of the 1963 oil shale leases. Exhibit "A", attached
to the complaint, is a photocopy of one of the leases issued to
one of the plaintiffs for a primary term of 10 years, which would
expire and terminate on December 31, 1973, unless there were produc
tion within the leasehold (R. 6-8).
In paragraph 3 of the complaint, it is expressly admitted
that the 1963 oil shale leases issued to plaintiffs "were to expire, by their terms as originally issued, on December 31, 1973
(R. 2-3)."

Plaintiffs also allege:

"6. On or about September 29, 1965, defendant's
director transmitted to all oil shale lessees by regular mail a letter, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Exhibit ' C , and plaintiffs acknowledge receipt of
said letter.
"7. Plaintiffs took no formal action with regard to the leases in response to Exhibit ' C , but
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiffs orally communicated to defendant's
director and other personnel their desire and intent that the leases be replaced by the new form of
oil shale lease adopted as set forth in Exhibit 'B'

/^^JT" (R. 3).
Max C. Gardner was the Director of the State Land Board
from 1961 to 1967. As Director, he signed the letter dated
September 29, "196.5, Exhibit
cept for his signature).

II i,
C #

attached to the complaint# ex-

His affidavit, attached to defendants'

motion for summary judgment (R. 93-97) never was controverted.
Mr. Gardner, in his affidavit, stated/ inter alia: '
"5« As Director of the State Land Boatd, I
signed the letter dated May 11, 1965, a copy of which
is attached to the answer of defendants as Exhibit 'I'*,
As Director I had a copy of such letter mailed to each
of the record owners of oil shale leases which had been
issued in 1963. As Director I also signed the letter
*\ dated September 29, 1965, a copy of which is attached
to the complaint as Exhibit 'C (except for my signature which is not shown on the exhibit attached to the
complaint). Enclosed with that letter dated September
29, 1965, mailed to each record owner of State oil shale
leases was a copy of the form of application to amend
the oil shale lease and also a copy of the new form of
oil shale lease, a copy of which new form of oil shale
lease is attached to the complaint as Exhibit '6-2".

•

"6. Inasmuch as Donald G. Prince was the man in
the State Land Office who had assigned to him the responsibility for processing mineral leases and applications to amend mineral leases, all applications to amend
the 1963 oil shale leases and the processing of the
amended form of oil shale leases in the State Land
Office would have been handled first by said Donald G.
Prince. After he processed the documents, we held what
we called 'Director's meetings'. We reviewed the documents processed and recommendations and any correspondence.
17
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In order to complete the amendment to oil shale
leases, as Director I had to sign for the State
of Utah and for the State Land Board the new form
or revised form of oil shale lease, a copy of which
is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 'B-2'. That
would not have occurred under the established procedures for processing mineral lease applications and
any applications for amendments of mineral leases,
until there was first received in the Land Office
(a) the application to amend mineral lease duly
signed by the record owner of the 1963 oil shale
lease, (b) the remittance of six cents ($#06) per
acre for amendment of the lease plus the filing fee
of $2.00 per lease, and (c) the new form of oil shale
lease in duplicate signed by the record owner of such
1963 oil shale lease. The record owner of the 1963
oil shale lease had to sign first each of the required
documents and then deliver them to the State Land
Office for processing, and then if foand in order by
Donald G. Prince, then at a 'Director's meeting' the
documents were examined by me, and if in proper order
I then signed the new form of oil shale lease as Director and one completely executed duplicate original
of that lease was then sent back to the record lease
owner as shown by the records of the State Land Office.
"7. I have read paragraph 7 of the complaint,
but to my best recollection none of the lessees named
in the oil shale leases designated in paragraph 3 of
the complaint ever told me personally or as director
that he or they desired to convert or amend their ten
year oil shale leases issued in 1963 into 20 year
leases. If any of them had told me of any such intent,
the procedure I would have followed would have been to
state that it would be necessary to comply with the provisions of the letter dated September 29, 1965. It was
entirely optional with each record owner of a 1963 oil
shale lease whether he or they complied with the terms
and conditions specified by the State Land Board in 1965
to amend the then existing oil shale lease or leases over
into a 20 year oil shale lease as offered by the letter
dated September 29, 1965" (R. 94-96).
The affidavit of Max C. Gardner was corroborated by the
uncontroverted affidavit of Donald G. Prince, also attached to

18
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defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 105-107).

Mr. Prince#

now Assistant Director of the Division of State Lands, has been an
employee of the State of Utah in the Land Office since 1954. Mr.
Prince stated, under oath:
"3. One of my responsibilities was to check on the
documents filed in the State Land Office involving any
mineral lands and rights in mineral lands# including documents relating to the 1963 oil shale leases, to determine
if the oil shale lease owners complied with the terms and
conditions of the letter signed by Max C. Gardner, as
Director, dated September 29, 1965, a copy of which is
attached to the complaint as Exhibit ' C . Since the
letter issued by the Director dated September 29, 1965,
(Exhibit 'C') offered to amend the 1963 oil shale leases
from 10 year leases to 20 year leases and a new or amended
form of oil shale lease was adopted and approved by the
Attorney General, before turning over to the Director the
documents relating thereto, I ascertained in each case the
following facts: (a) Whether the oil shale lease owner
of record in the State Land Office had signed the 'Application to Amend Mineral Lease', (b) whether the applicant
signed in duplicate the "Amended Form' of oil shale lease;
(c) whether the applicant paid the 6 cents per acre fee for
the amended form of oil shale lease; and (d) whether the
$2.00 fee required to accompany each application was paid.
I had to determine whether all of the requirements of the
letter dated September 29, 1965, had been met before I delivered them over to the Director with my recommendation
for approval. The Director did not sign the amended form
of oil shale lease in any case unless the lease owner of
the 1963 oil shale lease had first executed such new form
in duplicate. If any of those required items had been missing in any case, I would have written to the lease owner to
mention the omission and the fact that the Director would
not execute the amended form of oil shale lease until and
unless all of those requirements had been met.
"4. When all of those requirements had been met, I
recommended approval at what we called a 'Director's meeting',
19
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and after the documents were reviewed by the Director
they were submitted to the State Land Board or to its
successor Board of State Lands. I signed the defendants' responses to plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions
numbered 1 to 5 under date of August 2, 1974. I have
attached copies of minutes of Lhe Board of State Lands
showing Board approval in those cases wherein the 1963
oil shale lease owners complied with the terms of the
letter of the Director dated September 29, 1965. Those
minutes show Board approval of compliance by Western Oil
Shale Corporation, July 19, 1965; approval of applications
of Shamrock Oil and Gas Corporation, and H. Glenn George
on October 25, 1965, together with approval of applications of National Farmers Union Exploration Company, and
John C. Osmond; approval of applications of Shell Oil Company on November 6, 1965; approval of applications of Pan
American Petroleum Corporation December 20, 1965; and on
October 30, 1967, approval of additional applications to
amend oil shale leases by Western Oil Shale Corporation.
There are no minutes of the State Land Board or of the
Board of State Lands to approve any applications to amend
as to 1963 oil shale leases referred to in paragraph 3
of the complaint, for the reason that I know from my
search of the lease case files that there was no compliance
with the terms of said letter of September 29, 1965, nor
anything in the lease case file to show any effort at compliance at any time prior to December 31, 1973, when those
leases would have expired by the terms of those leases.
"5. No one ever contacted me on behalf of any of
the record holders of the 1963 oil shale leases described
in paragraph 3 of the complaint, down to and including
December 31, 1973 * * * ."
By adopting the new form of oil shale lease in 1965 with
a primary term of 20 years instead of 10 years, and by the inclusion
of some provisions differing from those contained in the 1963 form
of oil shale leases, the Land Board could not unilaterally amend
any of the existing unexpired 1963 oil shale leases. The letter
dated September 29, 1965 (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit
"C" to the complaint, except for omission of the signature of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

Director of the State Land Board), set forth the unequivocal
offer in writing made by the Land Board and precisely what the
holders of 1963 oil shale leases had to do in order to accept
the benefits of that offer:
"Applications to amend existing Oil Shale
leases or Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous Sands leases
will be granted upon receipt by this office of a
fully executed application and a fully executed
amendment of Oil Shale lease or a fully executed
addendum of Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous Sands lease
whichever the case may be* The applicant must also
tender a sum equal to 6^ per acre of the leased land
together with a $2.00 filing fee*" (Emphasis added)
The 1963 lease owners, as offerees, had to execute and
return to the State Land Office the form of application to amend
mineral lease adopted by the Board and the 1965 amended form of
oil shale lease approved by the Attorney General on September 20,
1965.

In addition, the offerees had to pay, with those executed

documents, a sum equal to six cents ($.06) per acre, plus a filing
fee of $2.00 with each application.

In order for an offeree to

accept such offer, it was imperative to comply with each of the
four requirements stated in that 1965 offer to amend the 1963 oil
shale leases. Although there was no proof, even if plaintiffs had
actually communicated orally "their desire and intent that the
leases be replaced by the new form of oil shale lease," such oral
expression could not legally constitute "acceptance." A tender of
less than complete compliance with all four requirements of the
offer would not amount to acceptance but a counter offer or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rejection of that offer.
The general rule is that where an offer in writing does
not specify the date by which it must be accepted, the law implies
a "reasonable time" for such acceptance.

Plaintiffs failed and

neglected to comply with the requirements of the September, 1965,
offer.

Assuming, arguendo, that such written offer could have been

construed legally to remain open until the last day of the term of
the 1963 leases (which defendants do not concede), the plaintiffs,
by their long continued neglect for more than 8 years and 3 months
to exercise an option to amend granted in September of 1965, by
noncompliance allowed their leases to expire and terminate on
December 31, 1973. Following that expiration date, there no
longer were any leases remaining in existence which could be
amended.
As shown by the uncontroverted affidavit of Donald G.
Prince (R. 56-60, 105-107), during the year 1965 many of the
lessees under 1963 oil shale leases fully complied with the four
requirements of the September 1965 offer to amend their oil shale
leases by executing the required documents and by paying the
specified fees.

The minutes of the Board show that the Board

formally approved amendment of the 1963 oil shale leases for
those who fully complied with the requirements stated in the
offer dated September 29, 1965.
22
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Summary judgment against plaintiffs was warranted
by plaintiffs' own admissions that their 1963 oil shale leases
would expire December 31, 1973, and that plaintiffs received
copy of the written offer dated September 29, 1965, and did
nothing required by the terms of that offer to effectuate an
acceptance thereof and amendment of those leases to prevent them
f£om expiring and terminating automatically on December 31, 1973.
Plaintiffs, by paragraph 6 of their complaint, "acknowledge receipt of said letter" dated September 29, 1965, from the
Director of the State Land Board.

By paragraph 7, it is expressly

admitted that "Plaintiffs took no formal action with regard to the
leases in response to Exhibit 'C

(R. 3)." That admission, in

plain language, means that plaintiffs did absolutely nothing to
comply with the requirements of the Board for acceptance of the
offer to amend, either by execution and delivery of the documents
specified or by payment of any of the required fees.

By answers

to interrogatories submitted by defendants, plaintiffs in substance
admitted (a) that they did not execute and file any application to
amend any of the 1963 oil shale leases, (b) that they did not execute and deliver to the State Land Office the amended form of oil
shale lease adopted in 1965, approved in form by the Attorney General, (c) that plaintiffs did not pay or tender the six cents
($.06) per acre fee for the amendment of each lease prior to the
1' 23
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expiration date of the leases, and (d) that plaintiffs never
paid the $2.00 filing fee at any time (R. 109-111).
On pages 11 and 12 of the Brief of Appellants, there is
an attempt to side-step plaintiffs1 unequivocal admissions that
they did not do the four things required by the letter dated
September 29, 1965, by the untenable argument that
" . . . the September Letter does not purport
to state an exclusive means of conversion, and (2)
the September Letter was never sanctified by any
Board action reflected by the minutes (i.e., the
Director was never instructed or authorized to send
it).11
Appellants make no claim that the Board ever made any
different or substitute offer to amend the 1963 oil shale leases.
The offer in the letter of September 29, 1965, sent by the Director of the State Land Board was the exclusive and only form of
offer made, and it was in accordance with the minutes.

The lessees

had no power to unilaterally amend the leases on their own terms.
If the appellants could say correctly that the Director never was
authorized to send the letter in question, then appellants infer
that there was no valid offer to amend by the letter offer of
September 29, 1965. That would mean that the 1963 oil shale
leases inevitably would expire on December 31, 1973.
Plaintiffs attached to their complaint as Exhibit n B"
portions of some minutes of 1965 Board meetings:

(a) On January

20, 1965, the Board considered the proposed amendments of oil
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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shale lease and new lease forms. Frank J. Allen was shown to
have been present.

The minutes expressly state that "The

Land Board also adopted as a definite provision an exchange
fee to be charged persons substituting old leases for leases on
the new form, of 6^ per acre/1 (b) on April 16, 1965, the Board
gave final approval to the form of application and the amended oil
shale lease form, and (c) in the meetings of September 8, 9, and
10, as shown by minutes as amended October 12, 1965, the amended
form of lease was approved by the Board.

The Attorney General also

approved such amended lease as to form by letter dated September 20,
1965 (R. 9-11).

The filing fee of $2.00 for application to lease

had been included in the Rules of the Land Board some time previously.
Section 65-1-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
for years has expressly provided:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the State
Land Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe
the form of application, the form of lease, the annual
rental, the amount of royalty, * * * and such other
details as it may deem necessary in the interests of
the State."
Not only does such statute require the application for
mineral lease and the mineral lease itself to be in writing, but
Section 65-1-18 also requires applications for mineral leases,
as well as mineral leases, to be in writing, by specifying:
25 '
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• " * * * All mineral leases issued by the
Board shall contain such terms and provisions as
the Board deems to be in the best interest of the
State. * * * Applications for mineral leases shall
be on such forms as the Board shall prescribe."
Section 65-1-76 expressly requires that:
"All leases and contracts of every kind entered
into by the State Land Board shall# before execution
by such Board, be approved as to form by the Attorney
General."
It would be utterly impossible for the Attorney General
to approve either an application for a lease or any mineral lease
or any other contract, except one in writing.

The foregoing statu-

tory requirements preclude any "oral understanding" or any "implied
contract."
Furthermore, Section 65-1-45# as amended in 1967, provided,
inter alia;
"In all cases where lands become available for
leasing by the land board because they are newly acquired, or because an existing mineral lease is canceled, relinquished, surrendered, or for any reason
terminates, except where the land board determines it
is not in the best interest of the State to offer the
land for lease, the land board shall offer the land
for subsequent mineral leasing by the following procedure only:
"(a) A notice of the lands having so become available for leasing shall be posted in the State Land Office.
The notice shall describe the land, indicate what mineral
interest in each tract is available for leasing and state
the last date, which shall be fifteen days after the
notice is posted, on which bids will be received.
"(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) all
applications for the lease of such lands filed before
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the closing date stated in the notice shall be
considered to have been filed simultaneously.
Such applications shall be submitted in sealed envelopes and shall be opened in the land office at
ten o'clock on the morning of the first business
day following the last day on which bids are receivable • The land board shall award leases to the highest responsible, qualified bidder in terms of the
bonus paid in addition to the first year's rental
who regularly submitted a bid in the manner required
by this act. In all cases of identical bids of successful bidders, right to lease shall be determined
by drawing. Drawings shall be participated in only
by those among whom the right to lease is equal, but
shall be accomplished publicly at the State land board
office.
"(c) At the discretion of the land board, mineral
leases may be offered at public auction upon such terms,
conditions, and minimum bid as may be prescribed by the
board.
11

(d) Following the awarding of leases to the
successful bidders, all deposits except filing fees
made by unsuccessful bidders shall be returned."
(Emphasis added)
The above-quoted portions of said amended Section 65-1-45
were in operation and effect when plaintiffs' 1963 oil shale leases
automatically expired and terminated on December 31, 1973, at the
end of the primary term of 10 years, inasmuch as there was no production within any of the leaseholds to effectuate an extension of
the primary term of 10 years. When those leases terminated by expiration, any further mineral leasing became subject to the competitive bidding procedures required by Section 65-1-45, as amended.
The Board had no authority to offer "or accept an offer made for
any noncompetitive oil shale lease with respect to those lands.11
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Plaintiffs had allowed the 1965 offer to amend those
1963 oil shale leases to expire and terminate by operation of
law as a result of the admitted failure and neglect of plaintiffs
themselves to timely execute and deliver the required amendatory
documents and to pay the specified fees stated in the letter of
September 29, 1965. Having the option to either accept such offer by complying with its specific terms and conditions, or not
to accept it, plaintiffs allowed that offer to expire and permitted
their 1963 leases to terminate.
leases.

The Board did not terminate those

The 1963 leases terminated by virtue of their express

terms and conditions, because plaintiffs themselves had neglected
to accept the offer to amend which had been made more than 8 years
and 3 months prior to the automatic termination dates of those
1963 leases. Upon their expiration, said leases ceased to have
any legal existence.
In consequence of the fatal admissions made by plaintiffs,
there being no material issue of fact nor of law as to termination
of those 1963 oil shale leases by reason of their automatic expiration and termination at the end of 1973, the District Court properly
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment of "no cause of
action" as a matter of law and for dismissal of the action with
prejudice.

The District Court also properly denied plaintiffs'

counter-motion for summary judgment.
28
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POINT II.
THERE WAS NO JURY QUESTION, BUT EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS HAD
REQUESTED A JURY TRIAL, DEFENDANTS WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO
A DIRECTED VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION" IN VIEW OF PLAINTIFFS1
ADMISSIONS.
The headnote under Point I of the Brief of Appellants
correctly states that "BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT
HAS RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT SUPPORT JURY FINDINGS OF
IMPLIED CONTRACT OR ESTOPPEL."

In consequence of the admissions

made by plaintiffs, and the express language of written documents,
there was no competent evidence to warrant any findings by a jury
or by the court of either "implied contract" or "estoppel." Not
only did defendants make a motion for summary judgment supported
by uncontroverted affidavits, but plaintiffs themselves made a
counter-motion for summary judgment, to which was attached an
affidavit of one of the plaintiffs, John H. Morgan, Jr. At the
time of oral argument, the court made inquiry as to whether there
was any additional evidence which could be presented if a trial
were conducted.

On page 1 of the Brief of Appellants, it is stated:

"The parties conceded that their evidence (including affidavits covering all testimony they would
adduce at trial) was before the court," and the court
"ruled that Appellants had no cause of action as a
matter of law."
The cases cited on pages 4 and 5 of the Brief of Appellants
clearly hold that summary judgment is^ warranted when there is n£
29
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material issue of fact to be resolved, and there remains only a
question of law.

In Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d

624, it was held that "no genuine issue of material fact was
raised and defendant's motion for summary judgment was properly
granted."

This Court further declared:

"The purpose of the summary judgment procedure
is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue may be raised by the pleadings, and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
"It is apparent here that the defendant has prodisced evidence that pierces the allegations of the
complaint. The plaintiffs have not controverted, explained or destroyed that evidence by counteraffidavit
or otherwise * * * ." (10 Utah 2d at page 269).
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants, by their
complaint, by responses to requests for admissions and by answers
to interrogatories clearly showed that their 1963 oil shale leases
would expire and terminate December 31, 1973; that notwithstanding* the Director of the State Land Board, on behalf of the
Board, issued a written offer to amend those 1963 leases by letter
dated September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs-appellants did not accept
said offer to amend, which offer could be accepted only by compliance with all four requirements stated in that letter-offer.
We now examine the affidavit of plaintiff, John H. Morgan,
Jr., which was attached to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
30
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(R. 112-115).

Morgan did not controvert the affidavits attached

to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He recited that
he was the plaintiff to whom correspondence from defendants had
been referred; that on or about April 8, 1965, the lessees entered into contract with Husky Oil Company, modified on May 25#
1964; that such contract was known to the Land Board; that affiant caused the leases and assignments of leases to be delivered
to plaintiff, Husky Oil Company (but he made no claim that those
assignments of leases were ever filed with the State Land Board
with a request for approval). At the hearing before the Board on
April 17# 1974# on plaintiffs' unique request that the Board "acknowledge that said leases had been extended," it was undisputed
that no assignments of the 1963 leases to Husky Oil Company were
ever filed with the Board and approved, so that all correspondence
was appropriately sent to the original lessees of record, including
the letter dated September 29, 1965.

It was admitted at such hear-

ing before the Board, on behalf of plaintiffs, that no documents
for amendment of the 1963 oil shale leases had ever been executed and
delivered to the State Land Office prior to the expiration dates
of the 1963 leases; and that said John H. Morgan, Jr., had told
an assistant attorney general that the six cents ($.06) per acre
had not been paid, and that it probably had been "overlooked"
(R. 102-104).
3
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However# in said affidavit of plaintiff Morgan,
it was alleged that affiant:
" • • . on behalf of the original lessees,
has since transmitted all notices except billings and all correspondence from defendants with
regard to the Leases (including the letters and
enclosures of May 11 and September 29, 1965, referred to in the pleadings herein) to plaintiff
Husky Oil Company; that affiant believed, at all
times after referral of the aforesaid 1965 correspondence to Husky Oil Company, that the Leases had
been converted to the oil shale lease form adopted
by defendants in 1965; * * *"(R. 113-114).
(Emphasis added)
The admissions contained in the complaint and established on discovery proceedings conclusively show that whatever
belief plaintiff John H. Morgan, Jr., entertained for more than
8 years and 3 months was not only contrary to the actual facts,
but utterly preposterous and unreasonable.

Neither the complaint

nor the affidavit of Morgan even alleged that Morgan or any of the
other plaintiffs at any time bothered to execute any of the amendatory documents or to pay any of the fees required for acceptance
of the 1965 offer of the Board for amendment of the 1963 oil shale
leases. An utterly unfounded belief could not possibly dispense
with compliance for acceptance of the written offer to amend.
Even if plaintiffs had intended to accept the offer to amend and
had even executed the required amendatory documents submitted to
them and had written out the checks for payment of the required
fees but neglected to deliver the executed documents and the
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checks for the required fees to the State Land Office, plaintiffs
could not have effectuated an amendment of any of those 1963
leases.
It will be observed that the claim made in the affidavit of plaintiff Morgan, attached to the counter-motion for
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs to the effect that affiant believed that the "leases had been converted to the oil
shale lease form adopted by defendants in 1965#" was utterly
inconsistent with the unique request to the Board in 1974 to
"acknowledge that said leases had been extended/1 when the
Board never made any offer to merely extend the primary term
of the 1963 leases.

Such alleged belief that the 1963 leases

"had been converted to the oil shale lease form adopted by defendants in 1965" also was materially at variance with the
specious conclusion in a subsequent part of said affidavit to
the effect that affiant "relied on the issuance of rental"
notices "as a representation and acknowledgment that the Leases
had been extended"(R. 114-115).

The Board never made any offer

for a mere extension of the primary term of the 1963 leases,
either gratuitously or on condition of payment of specified fees.
The 1965 amended form of oil shale lease involved not only a
longer primary term but included provisions differing from the
original 1963 form of oil shale leases.
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By his affidavit said plaintiff Morgan further recited
that about November 28, 1973, he received from defendant 1974
"rental billings" (rental notices) for each and all of the
leases in the same manner as were the "billings" for all other
State mineral leases; that shortly after receipt of such "billings" Husky Oil Company instructed affiant to pay the same; that
" • . . affiant, on December 31, 1973, hand
delivered to defendants the check and letter of
which copies are attached as "Exhibit C ; that
the time stamp appearing on Exhibit C was affixed on the original and on affiant*s copy at
the State Land Office by defendants' employee;
that affiant and all plaintiffs, in affiant's belief, relied on the issuance of the 1974 rental
billings for the Leases as a representation and acknowledgment that the Leases had been extended; that
it is affiant's practice each year to check billings
received against lease records to verify that all
leases considered to be in continuing effect have
been the subject of billing so that any questions
can be resolved before the end of the lease year;
on receipt of the 1974 rental billings for the
Leases at $1.00 per acre (whereas the rental rate
had been 50c per acre for the first ten years) affiant and his associates in fact checked the billings against plaintiffs' lease records for the
Leases and proceeded thereafter on the understanding
confirmed by the billings that the Leases had in fact
been extended; that, except for his receipt of billings for the Leases, affiant would have been alerted
to danger of termination and would have acted to prevent it; that, as soon as defendants informed affiant
of defendants' contention the Leases had expired, affiant and all plaintiffs took all reasonable action
to correct any possible defect in the procedures for
extension they had followed "(R. 114-115).
Plaintiff Morgan used the term "rental billings" in lieu
of the correct term "rental notice" in a possible attempt to infer
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that the State had some duty to issue such notice.

The State

statutes, Title 65, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953# as amended, do not
require the Board to issue any advance notice of any rental
which may become due under the terms of a mineral lease.

It is

significant that in connection with plaintiffs1 counter-motion
for summary judgment, they presented a copy of the Rules and
Regulations of the Board as amended to June, 1973.

"RULE 14 -

RENTAL NOTICES", reads as follows:
"Advance notice of rental due is usually sent
to the Lessees by the State Land Board, but failure
to receive such notices shall not act to relieve the
lessee from the payment of the rental and the lease
shall be in default if such payment is not made as
provided in the lease"(R. 164).
The rule adopted by the Board for sending notice of "rental
due" does not authorize anyone in the State Land Office to send a
notice of "rental due" for a year following the expiration of a
mineral lease.

Inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellants expressly

alleged and proved that their leases automatically expired and
terminated December 31, 1973, there could not possibly have been
any rental due for 1974. Paragraph 7 of the uncontroverted affidavit of Charles R. Hansen, Director of the Division of State
Lands, shows that no one was authorized to send any rental notice
for "1974 rentals" on the 1963 oil shale leases except to oil
shale lease owners whose leases had been amended and therefore
35
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continued to exist after December 31, 1973; and that the
sending of any rental notice on 1963 oil shale leases described in paragraph 3 of the complaint was a clerical error
(R. 100). The uncontroverted affidavit of Donald G. Prince
(presently assistant director), who has been a member of the
staff of the State Land Office since 1954, also shows that he
did not authorize the sending of the so-called "billings for
1974 rentals" to plaintiffs, and that sending such notices
was a clerical error (R. 107).
There was no contract right nor statutory right nor
any right, under Rule 14, to receive a rental notice (which
appellants have described as a "rental billing").

Consequently,

the sending of erroneous rental notices for 1974, which was the
year beyond the expiration dates of the 1963 oil shale leases,
could not impose on the lessees, whose leases were expiring on
December 31, 1973, any legal duty to pay any rental for 1974.
On December 31, 1973, Utah Resources International, Inc., by
its president, John H. Morgan, Jr., left at the State Land
Office a check for $24,258.50 for "1974 rentals" (R. 46-48,
50-51).

That check was shown by the accompanying letter to

be for 1974 rentals actually becoming due for 1974 on certain
oil, gas and hydrocarbon leases and bituminous sands leases—
leases not expiring December 31, 1973.

Included in such check
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for $24,258.50 was an aggregate amount of $13,834.00 for
"1974 rentals" on 1963 oil shale leases (which were expiring December 31, 1973).

As shown by the affidavit of Donald

G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division of State Lands,
said check was deposited for collection about January 4, 1974,
for the reason it included sums becoming due for rentals on
oil, gas and hydrocarbon leases and bituminous sands leases
which would not expire on December 31, 1973 (R. 49-53).
When it was ascertained that the 1963 oil shale leases
had not been amended and that they had expired December 31,
1973, the Board, on-March 8, 1974, directed refunds in the
total amount of $13,834.00, included in the check for $24,258.50
for 1974 rentals, because 1974 rentals were not payable on those
oil shale leases expiring December 31, 1973 (R. 46-48, 49-53).
Refund checks were issued and mailed March 12, 1974, by the
Director of the Division of State Lands (R. 52, 68-69).

As

stated on page 4 of the Brief of Appellants, "the board returned the money to Appellants, with the announcement that it
considered the Leases to have expired"(R. 50-52).
On February 26, 1974, which was nearly two months after
the 1963 oil shale leases expired, Utah Resources International,
Inc., by John H. Morgan, Jr., its president, issued a check to
the Division of State Lands in the amount of $829.78 for the
37
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computed six cents ($.06) per acre in the 1963 oil shale
leases (which had not been amended).

Following a hearing

before the Board on April 17, 1974, at the request of appellants that the Board "acknowledge that said leases had
been extended," the Board denied such application and advised
applicants in writing that they had failed to prove compliance with the terms and conditions of the letter dated
September 29, 1965, and that all of the 1963 oil shale leases
issued to them had expired December 31, 1973, and could not
be reinstated nor extended.

The check for $829.78, dated

February 26, 1974, was then returned (R. 65-69, 70-71).

In

his hereinabove-mentioned affidavit, plaintiff, John H. Morgan,
Jr., by substituting the term "rental billings" sometimes used
in lieu of "rental notices," jumped to an incompetent conclusion predicated on his alleged belief in disregard of the facts,
which he claimed was shared by other plaintiffs. Without any
factual foundation, Morgan resorted to a self-serving, invalid
conclusion:
" . . . that affiant and all plaintiffs, in
affiant's belief, relied on the issuance of the
1974 rental billings for the Leases as a representation and acknowledgment that the Leases had been
extended . . . ",
but he did not even mention what his belief was as to the period
of time those leases were believed to have been extended.
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Nor

did said plaintiff give any clue as to how those 1963 leases
could have been gratuitously extended for some unstated period
of days, months or years, when the Board never made any offer
for a mere extension of the 1963 leases# gratuitously or even
in consideration of payment of some fees.
Independent of lack of authorization for any of the
rental notices in question, they did not contain any language
which reasonably could be construed to constitute either a representation or an acknowledgment that any of the 1963 oil shale
leases in controversy had been "extended" by the State Land
Board, While plaintiff Morgan claimed "reliance" on documents
which did not purport to be more than mere rental notices for
1974 rentals, he did not recite any facts which could show any
actual representation that there was an "extension," nor any
right to rely on those rental notices as an "acknowledgment" by
the State that the leases had been "extended," nor any reasonable
reliance.

On the contrary, he refuted his professions of "reli-

ance" on the unauthorized 1974 rental notices by admissions
which would compel a finding that he did not rely on those unsigned rental notices, and that he had no right to rely on such
rental notices, by saying:
"It is affiant's practice each year to check
billings received against lease records to verify
r , T •' .
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that all leases considered to be in continuing
effect have been the subject of billing so that
any questions can be resolved before the end of
the lease year; on receipt of the 1974 rental
billings for the Leases at $1.00 per acre * * *
affiant and his associates in fact checked the
billings against plaintiffs1 lease records for
the Leases"(R. 114-115).
Inasmuch as plaintiffs admitted that they "in fact checked
the billings against plaintiffs1 lease records/1 they could not
possibly have found in those lease records any Amended Oil
Shale Lease offered in 1965# because plaintiffs had failed to
pay the required fees and had neglected to execute and deliver
the required amendatory documents specified in the letter-offer
of September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs did not claim, nor could they
truthfully claim, that when they checked their lease records
against the purported 1974 rental notices, they actually found
in those lease records any amended 1965 form of oil shale lease,
for it is undisputed that plaintiffs never did any of the things
required for acceptance of the 1965 amendatory offer.

After at-

tempting to show diligence by checking their lease records,
plaintiff Morgan resorted to the absurd conclusionary argument
that plaintiffs
" . . . proceeded thereafter on the understanding confirmed by the billings that the Leases had
in fact been extended . . . ",
when common sense would compel a conclusion that the pretended
"understanding"was merely a false assumption.

An examination
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of the lease records by any intelligent person would alert
such person to the fact that there was no executed copy of
the 1965 amended form of oil shale lease in the lease records,
because plaintiffs had failed and neglected to do the things
essential for acceptance of the 1965 offer for amendment of those
leases.
Plaintiffs admittedly had done nothing to accept the
1965 offer to amend, made more than 8 years and 3 months prior
to the December 31, 1973, lease expiration date. During that
entire time, plaintiffs claimed they entertained a belief
(which was utterly false), to the effect that the 1963 leases
had been "extended,11 when the Board never had made any offer
to gratuitously extend the primary term of the 1963 leases.
Nevertheless, affiant Morgan attempted to excuse the inexcusable
negligence of plaintiffs to take the required steps for amendment of the leases by the self-serving proclamation that
"except for his receipt of billings for the
Leases, affiant would have been alerted to danger of
termination and would have acted to prevent it;"
but affiant failed to disclose just what he possibly could or
would have done to prevent expiration of the 1963 leases on
December 31, 1973, since there never had been any amendment of
those leases in accordance with the terms of the only offer ever
made by the Board for their amendment.
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Then affiant Morgan, on behalf of himself and his
co-plaintiffs, finally resorted to the specious argument:
" • • . that as soon as defendants informed
affiant of defendants' contention that the Leases
had expired, affiant and all plaintiffs took all
reasonable action to correct any possible defect
in the procedures for extension they had followed."
(R. 115).
The fact is that plaintiffs never followed any "procedures for extension." Neither affiant Morgan nor any of the
other plaintiffs ever stated just what they claimed they did
which could possibly constitute "all reasonable action to correct any possible defect in the procedures for extension they
had followed."

The representation that plaintiffs followed any

"procedures for extension" of the 1963 leases was entirely without factual foundation.

The only "defects in procedure" con-

sisted of the neglect of plaintiffs to do any of the things for
timely acceptance of the Board's 1965 offer to amend the leases.
The plaintiffs had no power to unilaterally "extend" the primary
term of those 1963 leases. Consequently, there was no "reasonable action" which plaintiff could have taken on December 31,
1973, to prevent expiration of those leases at the end of that
day.
The respondents were entitled to summary judgment of
"no cause of action," for appellants presented, by the affidavit
'••.
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of John H. Morgan, Jr., all of the "evidence" on which plaintiffs
would have relied if there had been a trial. Assuming that there
had been a jury trial, defendants-respondents would have been entitled to a directed verdict of "no cause of action," for the
following reasons:

(a) The testimony (as outlined and set

forth in the affidavit of plaintiff, John H. Morgan, Jr.) consisted of declarations of belief contrary to the actual factsP
(b) The evidence consisting of unwarranted false assumptions and
conclusions was incompetent, (c) There were fatal admissions of
fact which conclusively showed that plaintiffs received the written offer to amend the 1963 lease under date of September 29, 1965,
but never executed and delivered any of the amendatory documents
nor paid any of the required fees for effectuating any amendment.
(d) The rental notices for 1974 rentalsjon the 1963 leases in
question never were authorized and sending them was a clerical
error, (e) While plaintiffs claimed that they "relied" on such
rental notices (which they chose to refer to as "rental billings")
"as a representation and acknowledgment that the Leases had been
extended," independent of the issuance of such rental notices by
clerical error and without authority, there was no language in
such rental notices which reasonably could be construed to constitute either a representation or an acknowledgment by an authorized person that any of the 1963 oil shale leases had been
43
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unilaterally "extended" by the Board, (f) There could not
have been any reasonable reliance on such rental notices,
since plaintiffs "checked those rental" notices with their
lease records. By checking with the lease records, any reasonable person would have been alerted to the fact that those
leases had not been amended nor "extended" in consequence of
plaintiffs' own neglect, (g) There was nothing plaintiffs
could possibly do under the Utah statutes on December 31, 1973,
when a check was presented to cover not only "rentals" for 1974
on the leases expiring that day but also for rentals due on
mineral leases not then expiring* (h) Refund checks were mailed
March 12, 1974, for rentals offered on the expiring 1963 oil
shale leases, (i) Contrary to the arguments of appellants, their
leases expired and terminated by their own terms. Respondents
did not terminate any of those leases.
POINT III.
APPELLANTS' ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ON THE STATE LAND BOARD
A NEBULOUS "IMPLIED CONTRACT BY ESTOPPEL" FOR EITHER EXTENSION
OF THE TERM OF THE 1963 LEASES OR REPLACEMENT OF THOSE LEASES
BY THE 1965 AMENDED FORM OF OIL SHALE LEASES, NOTWITHSTANDING
APPELLANTS' OWN ADMITTED NEGLECT TO ACCEPT TIMELY THE 1965 OFFER TO AMEND, WOULD VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE PAROLE
EVIDENCE RULE, AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH STATUTES.
Under Point II, on pages 7 to 12 of the Brief of Appellants, there is a nebulous argument that "the evidence would
justify a jury in finding extension of the leases by implied
•' • • 4 4
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contract."

Under Point II of this Brief of Respondents# we

point out that even if there had been a jury trial, the defendants would have been entitled to a directed verdict of
"no cause of action" for lack of any competent evidence to
support the claims asserted by plaintiffs. No jury could reasonably believe that plaintiffs-appellants had done what they
admitted they never did.
By further argument, on page 6 of Brief of Appellants#
claim is made that "the conduct of Respondents in this case
implied a promise to renew or extend the Leases/' but there was
no competent evidence, nor was there any evidence that the State
declared a "forfeiture."

The 1963 leases all terminated by ex-

piration in accordance with the terms of the leases. On page 8 #
appellants contend that "a contract may be established by conduct alone without any expression in writing or by parole."
They cite Kimball Elevator Co. y# Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah
2d SfiJV

In that case, the jury, by instruction, was permitted

to speculate and find an "implied agreement" from a "course of
dealing" involving a number of unaccepted written offers. In
reversing the judgment based on such jury verdict, this Court
observed that "the basis upon which Kimball seeks to make out
a promise on the part of Elevator Supplies not to submit a competitive bid is nebulous indeed."
45

Furthermore, this Court in
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that case stated what counsel for appellants in this case
seems to have overlooked:
« * * * Nevertheless we fail to see how,
taking all of the evidence and every reasonable
inference that may fairly be derived therefrom
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
, as we are obliged to do, a finding that Elevator
Supplies made any such promise in the instant
'l case can be supported. Likewise we find no circumstances here from which it could reasonably
* be concluded that silence or inaction with respect to such request amounted to an acceptance.ff
5 On page 6 of their brief, appellants cite Oil Shale
Corporation v. Larson, 20 Utah 2d 369, 438 P.2d 540, but that
case does not support any contentions of appellants. That
case involved interpretation of a written instrument, which
document this Court held to be unenforceable, among other reasons, for lack of any provision as to when the lease would begin or when it would end.

Consequently, if a written agreement

for a lease must specify a termination date, there certainly
could not be any "implied oral agreement'1 for extension of a
lease without a definite understanding as to when the claimed
"extension" would end.
On page 9 of their brief, counsel for appellants admit:
"We find no Utah case where the promise inferred from conduct was
specifically to extend a lease."

Counsel for appellants also

overlook the fact that the express provisions of Sections
65-1-18 and 23, U.C.A. 1953, require an application for mineral
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lease, as well as a mineral lease to be in writing. DefendantsRespondents not only invoked the parole evidence rule but, by
affirmative defenses, pleaded said Utah statutes and also the
Statutes of Fraud, Sections 25-5-1 and 4(1); also that all leases
and contracts entered into by the State Land Board must be approved as to form by the Attorney General, Section 65-1-76,
U.C.A. 1953. All of those statutes would bar any claim of "implied contract" by "estoppel" or otherwise.

^'

Nevertheless, on page 9 of the Brief of Appellants, it
is argued that "the board indicated its understanding that the
Leases were extended not only by amending its accounting records
to show an additional ten-year account period, but also by billing and receiving 1974 rental at a rate which could only apply
to a period beyond the initial term of the lease."

However, as

shown under Point II of this brief, the Board did not authorize
the sending of any rental notices (which plaintiffs referred to
as "billings"), except on leases not expiring. As shown by the
affidavit of the former director of the State Land Board (R. 96),
he did not authorize any change in the accounting cards, except
as to those 1963 oil shale leases where the lease owners complied
with the terms and conditions of the letter-offer to amend, dated
September 29, 1965. The affidavit of Charles R. Hansen, present
director of the Division of State Lands (R. 99), denies that he
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authorized any changes in the accounting cards, except as to
those leases with respect to which there had been full compliance with the requirements of the letter of September 29, 1965.
Both of those affiants denied there was any oral "understanding."
Furthermore, two of the accounting cards never were changed to
include a "new payment schedule" (R. 50-51).

Notwithstanding

the argument that the accounting records were changed, the affidavit of John H. Morgan, Jr., does not show that he knew anything
about the alleged changes until after the 1963 leases expired.
He, therefore, could not have relied on those office records for
some undefined "understanding."

Furthermore, the accounting

records were intended for office use, and they could not possibly
be construed as a part of an "implied contract."

There was no

proof of a meeting of the minds.
Contrary to the argument, under Point III of Brief of
Appellants, starting on page 13, there was no conduct of the
Board which could "estop" the Board "to deny the extension of
the leases." We agree with the doctrine announced in Farmers
and Merchants Bank v. Universal CIT Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155,
289 P.2d 1045, that "equitable estoppel" is based on the concept
that when one person makes representations to another which
warrant the latter in acting in a given way, the one who made
the representations will not be permitted to change his position
when such change would bring about inequitable consequences.
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There were no "representations11 made by the Board to work any
"estoppel", equitable or otherwise.

The appellants seem to

have their concepts of estoppel in reverse, for the Board made
no representations to induce plaintiffs not to accept the Board's
offer of September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs simply neglected to accept the written offer. As to payment of "1974 rentals/1 in consequence of the erroneous unauthorized 1974 rental notices, when
the Board ascertained that the 1963 leases had expired December
31, 1973, and that no rentals could possibly be due for 1974
rentals, the Board, on March 8, 1974, ordered refunds, and the
Director issued and mailed the refund checks on March 12, 1974.
Appellants acknowledge the refunds, as shown on page 4:

"The

Board returned the money to Appellants with the announcement that
it considered the Leases to have expired (R. 50-52)."
There is no merit to the suggestion made on page 12 of
their brief that appellants should have been given a 30-day "written notice" to "rectify a claimed delinquency" in accordance with
Section 65-1-90, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, by reason of appellants1
failure to comply with the letter-offer of September 29, 1965.
That provision of the statutes relates to violation of a provision of a mineral lease. The Board never claimed any default nor
any violation of the terms of the 1963 leases. The Board did not
"terminate the lease without notice;" nor any of those leases.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
by their own neglect to accept the 1965
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offer to amend, permitted those leases to expire and terminate
by their own terms. Appellants' own arguments concerning "implied contract" and "estoppel" illustrate the fallacies of those
arguments by trying to make the Board responsible for appellants'
own failure to timely accept the 1965 offer to amend the leases.
On page 15 of the Brief of Appellants, it is appropriately
stated:

"We are not aware of a Utah case where estoppel has been

applied directly against the Utah State Land Board," but appellants cite a number of cases which have no possible application
to the actual facts of this case. Finally, appellants, on page
16, complain that the Board did not issue some regulations with
respect to the conversion of oil shale leases. The 1965 offer
to amend was issued to every lease owner of record.

If there

were any basis to appellants' argument that the letter-offer of
September 29, 1965, was unauthorized because there was no "regulation" covering the subject matter, then there was nothing to prevent the expiration of the 1963 oil shale leases on December 31,
1973.

That argument also refutes their claims of "estoppel."
On page 16 of their brief, appellants argue, without

foundation, that they "relied" on an "amendment of accounting
records" and "acceptance" by the Board of "1974 rentals."
could not possibly have relied on unauthorized changes on
":; 50 .
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There were no "representations" made by the Board to work any
"estoppel", equitable or otherwise.

The appellants seem to

have their concepts of estoppel in reverse, for the Board made
no representations to induce plaintiffs not to accept the Board's
offer of September 29, 1965. Plaintiffs simply neglected to accept the written offer. As to payment of "1974 rentals," in consequence of the erroneous unauthorized 1974 rental notices, when
the Board ascertained that the 1963 leases had expired December
31, 1973, and that no rentals could possibly be due for 1974
rentals, the Board, on March 8, 1974, ordered refunds, and the
Director issued and mailed the refund checks on March 12, 1974.
Appellants acknowledge the refunds, as shown on page 4:

"The

Board returned the money to Appellants with the announcement that
it considered the Leases to have expired (R. 50-52)."
There is no merit to the suggestion made on page 12 of
their brief that appellants should have been given a 30-day "written notice" to "rectify a claimed delinquency" in accordance with
Section 65-1-90, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, by reason of appellants'
failure to comply with the letter-offer of September 29, 1965.
That provision of the statutes relates to violation of a provision of a mineral lease. The Board never claimed any default nor
any violation of the terms of the 1963 leases. The Board did not
"terminate the lease without notice;" nor any of those leases.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
by their own neglect to accept the 1965
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offer to amend, permitted those leases to expire and terminate
by their own terms. Appellants' own arguments concerning "implied contract" and "estoppel" illustrate the fallacies of those
arguments by trying to make the Board responsible for appellants'
own failure to timely accept the 1965 offer to amend the leases.
On page 15 of the Brief of Appellants, it is appropriately
stated:

"We are not aware of a Utah case where estoppel has been

applied directly against the Utah State Land Board," but appellants cite a number of cases which have no possible application
to the actual facts of this case. Finally, appellants, on page
16, complain that the Board did not issue some regulations with
respect to the conversion of oil shale leases. The 1965 offer
to amend was issued to every lease owner of record.

If there

were any basis to appellants' argument that the letter-offer of
September 29, 1965, was unauthorized because there was no "regulation" covering the subject matter, then there was nothing to prevent the expiration of the 1963 oil shale leases on December 31,
1973.

That argument also refutes their claims of "estoppel."
On page 16 of their brief, appellants argue, without

foundation, that they "relied" on an "amendment of accounting
records" and "acceptance" by the Board of "1974 rentals."
could not possibly have relied on unauthorized changes on
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office accounting records which they did not even claim to have
seen at any time before their leases terminated by expiration.
Appellants have cited a number of cases and some text statements#
none of which hold that a party who has allowed his state mineral lease to expire has a right of action to compel the State to
suspend the operation of its statutes to grant him either an extension of the primary term of a lease after it has expired or
an amended lease which he rejected by nonacceptance of an offer
to amend made more than 8 years previously.
C O N C L U S I O N
By way of conclusion counsel for appellants declares
that they "acted in good faith" when they admitted they did absolutely nothing during a period of more than 8 years after
they received the Board1s offer to amend.

Summary judgment

of no cause of action" was warranted by plaintiffs' own admissions and affidavit# independent of defendants' affidavits.
If there had been a jury trial, respondents would have been
entitled to a directed verdict. Consequently, the judgment of
the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B . ROMNEY

Atftbxnoy /Geri^ral

A

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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